Farewell KC-10

Pilots and boom operators are sad to contemplate the September 2024 retirement of the KC-10, the aerial refueling tanker based on the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airframe.

Though the Air Force operates only 59 KC-10s compared to 396 KC-135s and a planned 128 KC-46s, each of the Extenders packs a punch. The KC-10 can carry up to 356,000 pounds of fuel: far more than the KC-46 (212,299 pounds),and the KC-135 (200,000 pounds). The Extender is equally impressive at carrying cargo: its maximum payload is 170,000 pounds, which is nearly the same as the C-17, a dedicated transport jet, according to the Air Force....

As RVS [Remote Vision System] 2.0 comes down the pipe, a community of airmen who have spent much of their careers flying the KC-10 must prepare to bid farewell to the aircraft. Not everyone in that community agrees with the decision to retire the KC-10, which in several ways is more capable than its fellow tanker aircraft. KC-10 pilots Lt. Col. Stewart Welch and retired Col. David LeRoy wrote in 2019 for War on the Rocks that the 2013 U.S. budget sequestration forced the military to cut many of its programs, including the Extender.

"Because there is only a small fleet of KC-10s, it is relatively expensive to operate considering flying hours and maintenance costs per aircraft. Eliminating an entire logistics supply chain for an airframe offers a significant cost savings," they wrote. "That allowed the Air Force to keep programs like the KC-46 and F-35 on track."

It's disgusting to see the Air Force scrapping an aircraft with unparalleled capabilities in favor of unproven boondoggles at a time when force projection over long distances is more important than ever. KC-10 pilots Welch and LeRoy wrote in 2019:

America's return to great power conflict requires a force that can reach China and Russia from far-away U.S. air bases. Whether the Air Force is moving a large number of fighters, transporting cargo and personnel, or refueling long-range bombers, a long-range, large-capacity airplane is required. The Extender remains the best platform to refuel those strategically vital flights.

America's strategic focus has shifted from containing terrorist groups like ISIS to competing with rising great powers. The ability of countries like China and Russia to contest U.S. efforts in multiple domains will limit America's basing options. This will demand the types of advanced warfighting planes that can't reach distant targets from America's shores without air refueling. Deterrence today requires reach, which requires volume. The current plan to replace the heavy tanker with a fleet of smaller-capacity ones creates an unnecessary vulnerability. Policymakers should seriously consider funding and keeping the KC-10. The problem is urgent because the United States is quickly running out of time to act to preserve this capability. If there is any appetite to keep this aircraft flying, now is the time to articulate that decision and act on it. Once the Air Force uproots simulators and turns off training pipelines, it will be past the point to actually salvage an airplane that is strategically necessary....

In April 2019, the first-ever tanker formation of a KC-10 and a KC-46 refueled two F-15Es and five F-16s flying from California to Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. The successful mission was rightly lauded as an achievement for the Pegasus; what did not make the press report was the fact that if the KC-46 had not flown, a single KC-10 could have accomplished the entire mission alone, offloading all the gas required for all seven fighters to reach their destination. In fact, the formation was part of an overall plan that utilized six KC-10s to offload 680,000 pounds of gas to 28 airborne aircraft and haul 62,000 pounds of cargo plus 38 passengers. It would require fourteen of the smaller tankers to accomplish the same task. In the near future, what the Air Force has been doing with one refueler will require two. This reality has had many scratching their heads and wondering why the Extender is on the verge of an early retirement.

Sadly, the uprooting of simulators has already started to happen. Friends in the simulation industry report that the KC-10 simulator fleet (two full-flight simulators, a fixed-base simulator, and a boom operator trainer each at Travis AFB in California and McGuire AFB in New Jersey), received major upgrades in the past decade or so, including new computers for aircraft simulation, instructor control, radio communication and ambient sound simulation, networked mission rehearsal, formation flight, and aerial refueling training, plus the security upgrades required for networked mission rehearsal. With the upcoming retirement, only one of each simulator type remains, at Travis AFB. One friend reports seeing large chunks of one of the surplus simulators cut up in dumpsters.

RVS 2.0, mentioned above, is the KC-46 Pegasus system for the boom operator to see the receiver aircraft and fly the boom into the receptacle, while sitting in the cockpit with the flight crew. On the KC-135 the boomer lies on his belly to look out a window at the receiver. The KC-10 is slightly more civilized, as the boomer sits upright. The original version of the KC-46 RVS has problems:

Known as the Remote Vision System, the new technology should allow boom operators to refuel aircraft in complete darkness with both aircraft running lights-out. The problem is that the system is riddled with errors, including the fact that shadow, glare or other conditions made it more difficult for the boom operator to see what is going on. Operators have also noted differences in how objects are perceived on screen compared to real life. Those small glitches could have disastrous effects in the air, where a bump with the refueling boom could cause expensive damage or scratch the stealth materials keeping combat aircraft hidden from the enemy.

The demise of the KC-10 is a consequence of short-sighted decisions made 10 years ago in the midst of a budget battle over Obamacare funding. We have seen this at the city level, as stupid plans like pedestrianizing Main Street, ringing downtown with expressways, and demolishing Greenwood and the Near Northside, are pursued to the end, long after their folly becomes apparent and their value is overtaken by events. Bureaucracies don't change course easily. Stubborn refusal to admit a mistake, along with the costs sunk into that mistake, are the greatest source of governmental inertia. Strong, foresighted leaders in the DOD, White House, and on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees are needed to overcome that inertia, but who am I kidding?